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The Use of Annual Mileage as a Rating Variable
Abstract
Auto insurance companies are at a crossroads. Several variables commonly used, such as gender and territory,
are being questioned by regulators. Insurers are being pressured to find new variables that predict accidents
more accurately and are socially acceptable. Annual mileage seems an ideal candidate. The recent development
of GPS systems, on-board computers, and telematics devices, and the rapid decrease in price of the new
technologies, should induce carriers to explore ways to introduce Pay- As -You-Drive insurance. We use the
unique database of a major insur er in Taiwan to investigate whether annual mileage should be introduced as a
rating variable in third-party liability insurance. We find that annual mileage is an extremely powerful
predictor of the number of claims at-fault. Its significance, as measured by Wald’s chi -square and its associated
p-value, by far exceed that of all other variables, including bonus- malus. This conclusion applies
independently of all other variables possibly included in rating. The inclusion of mileage as a new variable
should, however, not take place at the expense of bonus-malus systems; rather the information contained in
the bonus-malus premium level complements the value of annual mileage. An accurate rating system should
therefore include annual mileage and bonus-malus as the two main building blocks, possibly supplemented by
the use of other variables like age, territory, and engine cubic capacity. While Taiwan has specific
characteristics (high traffic density, mild bonus-malus system, limited compulsory auto coverage), our results




Business | Economics | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/82
1 
 
The Use of Annual Mileage as a Rating Variable 
Jean Lemaire, Sojung Park, Kili Wang1 
 
Abstract 
Auto insurance companies are at a crossroads.  Several variables commonly used, such as gender and 
territory, are being questioned by regulators.  Insurers are being pressured to find new variables that 
predict accidents more accurately and are socially acceptable.  Annual mileage seems an ideal 
candidate.  The recent development of GPS systems, on-board computers, and telematics devices, and 
the rapid decrease in price of the new technologies, should induce carriers to explore ways to introduce 
Pay-As-You-Drive insurance. 
 We use the unique database of a major insurer in Taiwan to investigate whether annual mileage 
should be introduced as a rating variable in third-party liability insurance.   We find that annual mileage 
is an extremely powerful predictor of the number of claims at-fault.  Its significance, as measured by 
Wald’s chi-square and its associated p-value, by far exceed that of all other variables, including bonus-
malus.  This conclusion applies independently of all other variables possibly included in rating.  The 
inclusion of mileage as a new variable should, however, not take place at the expense of bonus-malus 
systems; rather the information contained in the bonus-malus premium level complements the value of 
annual mileage.  An accurate rating system should therefore include annual mileage and bonus-malus as 
the two main building blocks, possibly supplemented by the use of other variables like age, territory, 
and engine cubic capacity. While Taiwan has specific characteristics (high traffic density, mild bonus-
malus system, limited compulsory auto coverage), our results are so strong that we can confidently 
conjecture that they extend to all affluent countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
Auto insurers, in order to remain competitive in risk selection and pricing, are constantly seeking better 
ways to measure risk.  To this end, they adopt numerous rating variables – and, when unavailable, proxy 
variables – in order to better gauge how risky each particular customer is.  
 As is typical in American automobile third-party liability insurance, a major carrier uses a large 
number of variables in rating, including age, sex, and marital status of principal driver (with unmarried 
males paying a surcharge until the age of 30, unmarried females until 25), make and model of car, 
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territory (at zip code level), claims and traffic violations history, and use of car.  The main categories for 
car use are pleasure, commuting, business, farm use, military.  Commuters have to estimate the 
distance between home and work or school, as well as an estimate of total annual mileage.  While a 
precise mileage estimation has to be provided, the company only uses a single cut-off point in rating, at 
7,500 miles per year. 
 Representatives of the company privately acknowledge that they have few tools to ensure a 
truthful statement of variable values by policyholders.  The policy wording contains a statement that any 
person who knowingly attempts to defraud the insurer with an application containing false information 
can be subject to a fine and possible imprisonment.  Insurers occasionally phone policyholders to obtain 
verbal verification of mileage statements.  However, companies cannot deny a claim if it is 
demonstrated that the policyholder was not truthful in reporting mileage, nor can they increase 
premiums retroactively.  Consumer fraud and the inability of insurers to keep track of key lifestyle and 
driving habits of their customers are estimated to create over $16 billion in premium losses (called 
premium “leakage”), or nearly 10% of personal auto premium written (Insurance Services Office, 2008).  
The main fraud categories are misrepresentation of garaging addresses and youthful drivers, and 
understatement of annual mileage. 
 In May 2012, the company introduced in Pennsylvania a voluntary program to monitor mileage, 
using a telematics device (telematics is defined here as the technology of sending, receiving, and storing 
information via telecommunication appliances in vehicles).  Using the catchy slogan “Just have your car 
send us your driving habits”, the rating plan involves the use of a transmitter, that comes factory-
installed in all new vehicles sold by the largest US car manufacturer, or can be professionally installed on 
existing cars as replacement of the rearview mirror at a cost of $100.  A required subscription costing 
$200 per year provides automatic crash response, emergency services, roadside and stolen vehicle 
assistance, and diagnostic and maintenance information.  Additional services such as hands-free calling 
and GPS navigation can be purchased at an additional price.  Odometer readings are recorded, and e-
mailed monthly to the subscriber and the insurer.  Upon enrollment in the program, all insureds receive 
a 5% discount on liability, comprehensive, collision, and medical payments coverages.  As odometer 
readings become available, a premium discount is offered at each renewal, for instance 32% for 3,500 
annual miles, 13% for 11,000 miles, 5% for 15,000 miles.  If the policyholder had his premium based on 
self-reported annual mileage under 7,500, and if the actual mileage exceeds that threshold, the next 
premium is increased.   
 This company uses the telematics device only to record effective mileage.  Other companies 
monitor other driving habits, such as the use of the car between midnight and 4 a.m., speeds over 80 
miles per hour, as well as acceleration and breaking behavior and the type of roads travelled (urban, 
country, motorway) (Muermann and Kremslehner, 2012).  Premiums may be adjusted monthly, semi-
annually, or annually.  An international  consulting firm (Ptolemus Consulting Group, 2012) estimates 
that, world-wide in 2012, telematics-based insurance policies are in effect for more than two million 
subscribers.   
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 Auto insurance carriers may be at a crossroads concerning the classification variables they use.  
Regulators are questioning the use of some traditional variables like sex and territory, and request more 
accurate criteria.  Insurers have been reluctant to use annual mileage, despite its obvious correlation 
with claims, due to their inability to verify policyholders’ statements, and the relative easiness to tamper 
with odometers.  This had led them to use proxy variables like the use of the car or the distance 
between home and work.  Butler (2006) argues that no less than 12 widely used rating variables can be 
considered as proxies for odometer miles: sex, car age, previous accidents at-fault and not-at-fault, 
credit score, zip code, income, military rank, existence of a prior insurer, premium payment by 
installments, years with same employer, collision deductible, and tort rights. This situation may change 
rapidly, due to the development of telematics, on-board computers, sophisticated GPS transmitters, 
tampering-resistant odometers, and the fast decrease in cost of these new technologies. 
 In this research we investigate the impact of the use of mileage as a rating variable, using unique 
data originating from Taiwan.  As in that state the leading brand of cars also owns an extended network 
of repair shops that customers visit for routine maintenance and oil changes, data that include driver 
classification variables, claims, and annual mileage, were available for over a quarter million vehicle-
years.  A regression study analyzes the importance of annual mileage as compared to other rating 
variables used in Taiwan.  A model developed by Taylor (1997) is applied to evaluate the impact of 
mileage on the Taiwanese Bonus-Malus system.   
 Note that we do not consider Pay-at-the-Pump insurance, replacing premiums paid to insurance 
companies by a surcharge per gallon of gas at the pump.  This approach would revolutionize auto 
insurance, and has a very different set of advantages and disadvantages.  We are discussing here the 
pros and cons of using annual mileage as a rating variable in traditional insurance, as a replacement or 
as an addition to variables currently used. 
2. Statistical Studies 
It is intuitively obvious that annual mileage positively correlates with claim frequencies, since each mile 
a car travels creates a small chance of an accident.  The use of annual mileage as a rating variables has 
long been recommended by actuarial studies, dating as far back as Bailey and Simon (1960)’s seminal 
paper.  Several statistical studies have confirmed this conjecture: more time spent on the road 
translates into more traffic incidents, and more situations leading to claims.  The average number of 
claims significantly increases with annual mileage, but not proportionally – there are diminishing 
“returns”.  Doubling annual mileage increases the claim frequency, but does not double it.  This could be 
explained by the fact that high-mileage users are more experienced, or do more of their driving on low-
risk highways rather than high-risk urban areas.  Lemaire (1985) surveyed 3,995 policyholders of a 
Belgian company.  With an average annual distance driven of 15,344 kilometers, claim frequencies 
increased from 5.84% for policyholders driving less than 5,000 km/year to 10.44% for an annual distance 
in excess of 30,000 km.  The variable “annual distance travelled” proved to be highly significant in a 
regression explaining the number of claims.  Only claims history proved to be more significant.  The 
inclusion of annual mileage in regression allowed for the deletion of variables that would be difficult to 
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use in rating such as the number of not-at-fault claims, the age of the car, and the type of insurance 
coverage selected.  
 Ferreira and Minikel (2010) merged data from the Massachusetts Commonwealth Automobile 
Reinsurer (an industry-operated entity that collects rate-making data for all policies issued in the state) 
and odometer readings recorded by the Registry of Motor Vehicles during compulsory annual safety 
inspections.  They were able to analyze 2.87 million car years of exposure for policy year 2006, covering 
vehicles driven an aggregate of 34 billion miles, and found that claim frequencies increase with mileage, 
in a less-than-proportional way.  A three-fold increase in annual mileage, from 10,000 to 30,000, results 
in a claim frequency increase that less than doubles, from 5% to 8%.   
 Litman (2011) matched mileage readings collected during mandatory emission checks in the 
Vancouver region with individual vehicles’ insurance claim records, for more than 500,000 vehicle-years. 
Crash rates for all accidents (at fault or not) were found to increase from 4% for cars driving less than 
5,000 kilometers per year, to around 8% in the 20,000 – 25,000 km range, and slightly less than 10% 
once the annual number of kilometers driven exceeds 35,000.  Again, the relationship was found to be 
less-than-proportional, as the claims rate per kilometer driven decreases.   
3. Using Mileage in Rating: a Controversial Issue 
A large body of research addresses the advantages and disadvantages of mileage-based rating, usually 
abbreviated as PAYD (Pay-As-You-Drive).  Interestingly, studies are usually sponsored by lobbying 
groups, and have not found their way into the peer-reviewed insurance or actuarial literature. PAYD is 
supported by environmentalists and associations advancing the interests of females, seniors, and low-
income groups.  For instance, NOW, the National Organization for Women, claims than females are 
discriminated against by the current pricing scheme.  In the United States, females pay a lower premium 
than men, but only up to the age of 30.  There is no premium differentiation after 30.  NOW asserts that, 
as females drive significantly fewer miles than men (10,143 vs 16,553, according to the 2005 federal 
household transportation survey), pricing is discriminatory (Butler, 2006). 
  Groups that resist PAYD include the oil industry (due to the likely decrease in overall mileage 
driven and consequent reduction in oil consumption), and some segments of the insurance industry, as 
it requires changes in their practices and may decrease profits by reducing total premiums.  Some 
insurers argue that social benefits are much larger than benefits to individual insurers.  Most of the 
benefits of PAYD (reduced traffic congestion and pollution, and some fraction of accident costs) are 
externalities, so insurers would receive just a portion of the benefits, while incurring the full transaction 
and monitoring costs.  Benefits to the insurance industry may not outweigh additional costs (Wenzel, 
1995; Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2011).  Bordoff and Noel (2008) estimate the benefits to 
insurance companies at $34 per year per vehicle switching from traditional rating to PAYD, while the 
social benefit is estimated at $257 per car.   
 Some insurers offer PAYD pricing based on self-reported mileage.  At renewal time, 
policyholders must provide their odometer reading, sometimes supplemented by a digital photograph of 
the odometer.  The insurer performs random checks to monitor accuracy.  Alternatively, odometer 
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audits are performed by certified businesses, upon insurance renewal or upon mandatory inspections.  
Such policies are not likely to survive the current drastic price reductions of telematics devices, as they 
suffer from numerous disadvantages.  There is a clear conflict of interest for the consumer which makes 
the system unreliable; the consumer has an incentive to report an understated mileage figure, hoping 
that he will not be selected for spot-checking; any random check is bound to occur several weeks after 
mileage reporting, giving the driver plenty of time to invent an excuse to explain the discrepancy, such 
as an unexpected recent trip; the consumer could even photograph another odometer.  Non-digital 
odometers can be tampered.  Odometer accuracy is affected by factors such as tire size, wear and tear.  
Mileage self-reporting disregards additional behavior data such as night driving, unsafe speeds, and hard 
brakes.  There is no opportunity to generate additional revenue through the sale of ancillary services 
(Ptolemus Consulting Group, 2012; Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2011).  So it is likely that self-
reported mileage is on its way out, due to the unreliability of mileage statements and the rapid price 
decrease of computer-based devices. 
 The advantages of telematics-based mileage pricing are substantial: 
* Mileage pricing is more accurate, as it depends on individuals’ own behavior and is directly based on 
exposure to risk, and not on the behavior of groups of people such as single males or inhabitants of a 
given township.  PAYD improves fairness, by shifting weight in pricing towards an individually 
controllable factor, rather than based on involuntary membership in a group. Drivers have more control 
over their own premium.  Pricing does not rely on variables such as gender, age, and territory, that can 
become unlawful. 
* Subsidies across groups are decreased: safe, low-mileage drivers do not have to subsidize high-mileage 
road warriors. 
* Uninsured driving may reduce.  In some jurisdictions, a significant proportion of vehicles is uninsured 
because of high-premium costs.  Mileage-pricing would make insurance for low-mileage cars more 
affordable, which can help reduce the uninsured problem.  All policyholders would benefit, as the cost 
of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage would decrease. 
* Fraud opportunities are greatly reduced.  Any resulting decrease in insurance premium leakage can be 
returned to policyholders in the form of premium cuts. 
* If factors like excessive speeds and hard braking are taken into account, drivers have a strong incentive 
to improve driving skills and drive more carefully. 
* Traditional pricing does not present drivers with a marginal insurance cost per mile driven.  With 
PAYD, consumers have an incentive to drive less, leading to lower accident risks.   
* Since PAYD gives consumers an incentive to reduce their insurance costs, it is likely that PAYD will have 
the external benefit of reducing total national mileage driven.  Reduced driving has a positive effect on 
the environment (CO2 and other air pollutants emissions, noise, traffic congestion). It reduces time 
wasted in traffic jams, fuel consumption, and helps nations move towards energy independence.  It 
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decreases accident probabilities not only for the policyholder, but also for other road users.  Indeed, a 
fall in mileage clears traffic from roads and reduces the likelihood of accidents for everyone (including 
non-drivers).  Accident savings accrue to all other drivers and their insurance companies when any one 
driver forgoes a mile – obviously when a driver is off the road, no one has a chance of being involved in 
an accident with him.  This is called accident externality.  Bordoff and Noel (2008), using aggregate data, 
estimate externality savings in the US averaging 2.4 cents per mile, with wide variations across states 
due to traffic density – up to 54 cents per mile in Hawaii, the most congested state. Huang, Tzeng, and 
Wang (2012), using individual rather than aggregate data, obtain a much higher average externality cost 
of 13 cents per kilometer in Taiwan, probably due to the high traffic density in that country. 
Using an elasticity of miles driven with respect to the marginal per mile price of -0.15, Ferreira and 
Minikel (2010) estimate that per mile auto insurance pricing would reduce mileage, accident costs, and 
fuel consumption by 9.5%. Edlin (2003) estimates mileage savings at 10%, Bordoff and Noel (2008) at 
8%, equivalent to the savings that would result from a $1 per gallon tax increase. 
* In the case of monthly premiums, the delay between improved driving and premium discount is 
reduced.  With traditional pricing, claim-free driving is rewarded by a bonus-malus discount only at the 
next annual premium renewal.  With monthly reporting of driving behavior and mileage, policyholders 
get frequent signaling, prudent driving is rewarded faster.  With the consequences of each mile driven in 
mind, mileage-based insurance may have an immediate impact on the decision to start a particular trip. 
* Telematics devices can provide numerous side benefits, such as: 
 - Automatic crash assistance.  Medical services can be alerted immediately by the monitoring 
service, even if the driver is unconscious.  This may possibly increase survival probabilities, and reduce 
medical costs. 
 - Roadside assistance.  The monitoring service can provide real-time information about traffic 
problems, call assistance in case of a technical problem, even open car doors remotely if the key has 
been forgotten inside the car. 
 - Stolen car recovery.  The continuous emission of a signal by the transmitter greatly improves 
the chances of a stolen car being recovered by police rapidly. 
 - Production of a detailed logbook of daily distances covered for tax purposes. 
 However, telematics pricing has several important disadvantages: 
 - Installation and monitoring costs can be substantial for some categories of drivers. 
 - Premiums, depending on variable mileage, become less predictable for drivers and insurers. 
 - Telematics mileage monitoring is currently nearly exclusively used to provide discounts to 
policyholders; premium increases are rare, and often not approved by regulators.  This results in an 
overall reduction of premium income for the insurance industry, which may - or may not - be 
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compensated by a decrease in traffic crashes and costs. Insurers may suffer a loss if crash costs decrease 
less than premium income. Reduced premiums also mean reduced investment income and brokers 
commissions. 
 - If a large proportion of policyholders switch to PAYD and get discounts, the insurer will be 
forced to increase premiums for drivers keeping traditional rating (if approved by regulators).  This may 
create a “death spiral” of a dwindling number of insureds paying ever-increasing premiums.  This may 
create some unrest, if these insureds mostly belong to socially disadvantaged groups. 
 - Distance-based pricing is currently exclusively offered as an option.  This could create adverse 
selection, with policyholders driving less than average selecting PAYD to receive a discount, and high-
mileage consumers sticking to car-year pricing.  PAYD will attract drivers with high per-mile claim costs – 
urban drivers for instance. If all consumers continue to drive the same amount of miles, insurance 
premium income will decrease, with claim costs remaining at their current level.  Evidence of adverse 
selection was confirmed by Muermann and Kremslehner (2012) using European telematics data.  The 
number of car rides (controlling for mileage), speeding above limits, and relative distance driven on 
week-ends, were found to have significant impact on contract selection and risk. 
 - Motorists in multi-vehicle households could game the system by shifting driving from mileage-
priced cars to cars with fixed-rate premiums.  
 - Customer tracking can be perceived as intrusive, and as an invasion of privacy.  Customers may 
be leery of allowing their insurance company to track their location and driving hours. 
 - Practical and legal issues are bound to occur.  Exact mileage to be driven is uncertain at the 
beginning of the year.  As insurance premiums are always paid anticipatively, customers in practice 
would have to pre-pay for the miles they expect to drive.  A premium adjustment would then take place 
during, or at the end of the policy-year, in the form of a refund, a carry-over to next policy year, or an 
additional payment.  Policyholders cannot be expected to voluntarily self-report excess mileage;   
regulators will require the insurer to notice the excess and bill the policyholder accordingly, resulting in 
additional costs.  What if a claim occurs after the pre-paid number of miles has been exceeded?  Any 
position taken by the insurance industry than the claim is not covered, or that the company has the right 
to recover the cost from the policyholder, is certainly going to be challenged in court, with the insurer 
most likely to lose the case.   
 - The development of PAYD may be hampered by regulations, and by patents held by companies 
producing transmitters.  Many US states prohibit retrospective rating – which would be a feature of 
PAYD for drivers who exceed their estimated pre-paid mileage.   
4. The Data 
4.1. Background  
Taiwan has a land area of 32,260 sq. km, the size of Belgium, and a population of 23,113,900 in July 2012 
(CIA, 2012).  Two thirds of the state consist mostly of rugged mountains, leading to a very high 
8 
 
population density in the plains.  This density, along with the unavailability of parking in cities and the 
excellent public transportation network, results in a number of private cars that is low for an affluent 
country.  Only 4,675,000 non-commercial sedans were registered in 2010, for a state that has a GPD per 
capita (corrected for purchasing power) of $37,000, identical to Germany (Taiwan Insurance Institute, 
2012).  Very few couples own two cars. It is rare for young individuals to own a car, due to high cost and 
taxes.  Due to the presence of over 6.5 million motorcycles, traffic density is high – a further deterrent to 
multi-car ownership.   
 Automobile insurance is organized in a somewhat different way than in most western countries.  
Compulsory liability only covers bodily injury losses up to a limit that currently stands at NT$2,200,000 
per person (1 NT$ = US$ 29.994 as of August 2012).  The small increase of the limit during our 
observation period, from NT$1,600,000 to NT$1,700,000, is not expected to impact our study, as the 
vast majority of policyholders purchase coverage above the limit.  Voluntary policies provide additional 
third party bodily injury and property damage coverage.  Our data pools all of these policies, that are 
subject to the same rating variables and bonus-malus system.  First party collision coverage is also 
available, but not considered in this study, as subject to another bonus-malus system. 
 Only three a priori classification variables are used by Taiwanese insurers for rating purposes: 
use of car (personal / business), gender (male / female) and driver age (< 20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-60, >60). 
As females receive a discount, a fact well known to Taiwanese households, it is a common practice for 
couples to register their car to the female driver.  As a result, while the vast majority of drivers on the 
road are males, insurers report 70% of female drivers in their portfolios! 
 The bonus-malus system (BMS) has no upper limit in the malus zone.  However, no single driver 
in our sample pays more than a 60% surcharge.  Therefore, we can model the Taiwanese bonus-malus 
system as a 10-class Markov Chain, with premiums levels 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, and 
160.  New drivers start in class 4, at level 100.  Claim-free years are rewarded by a one-class discount, 
leading to a 10% premium reduction.  Each claim is penalized by three classes, or 30% of the basic 
premium.   
4.2. Data 
Our data result from the pooling of claim and policy information from the largest auto insurer operating 
in Taiwan (with a market share of 20%) with maintenance records from a chain of repair shops operated 
by the largest car manufacturer in the country (market share: 38%).  Besides claim records, insurance 
variables include the gender, age, and marital status of the main driver, territory, use of car, bonus-
malus class, and cubic capacity of the engine.  As odometer readings are systematically collected by 
repair shops during each visit, interpolation or extrapolation of odometer values between visits allows 
us to estimate annual mileage.  Data are available for seven policy years, 2001 to 2007.  All policyholders 
purchased the compulsory policy; 88.82% bought additional voluntary insurance.   
 All claims, whether reported under the compulsory contract or one of the voluntary policies, are 
recorded.  A claim may trigger a payment under a compulsory and/or a voluntary policy.  To avoid 
double counting, claims reported on the same date under two or three policies are counted as a single 
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claim. Unavoidably, some claims may be missed, for instance a property damage only claim, if the driver 
did not purchase the corresponding voluntary coverage – not a likely occurrence since nearly 89% of 
drivers in our sample purchase voluntary coverage. However, this may raise a potential problem, if high-
mileage users are more prone to purchase additional insurance.  If this is the case, more claims will be 
missed among the low-mileage drivers, and the impact of mileage on claim frequencies may be 
somewhat overstated.  Such a behavior is well-known in collision coverage, but fortunately, does not 
take place in our third-party sample, as shown in table 1.  (Policies are ranked by increasing mileage, and 
subdivided into ten equal-sized classes.  “40-50”, for instance, groups all policies with mileage comprised 
between the 40th and 50th percentile). 
 
Mileage class <10% 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 >90% 
% voluntary 87.86 87.94 88.16 89.08 89.38 88.93 89.02 89.14 89.62 89.12 
Table 1: Percentage of drivers purchasing voluntary coverage according to mileage class.  
 Our database is very large: over a quarter million policy-years, with a large set of different car 
models.  Still, it only represents about 0.8% of the Taiwanese auto insurance market.  Our sample may 
not be fully representative of the entire market, as it consists exclusively of drivers who (i) purchased a 
car from a particular brand; and (ii) use the dealer repair shops for maintenance.  In Taiwan as in 
western countries, maintenance and repairs performed by dealers are somewhat more expensive; the 
network of dealer repair shops is not very dense, so using the services of these shops may require more 
driving time.  Also, the waiting time at these shops may be longer than in specialized maintenance shops 
who perform basic services in a matter of minutes.  Therefore, our sample may be somewhat selected in 
the sense that it consists of car owners who feel highly responsible for their car maintenance – which 
may correlate with a more responsible driving behavior. These owners are more likely to be affluent, 
married, middle-age or old, all factors linked to a lower claim frequency (Bair et al, 2012). 
 On the other hand, our sample drivers probably have a much higher annual mileage than 
average.  The average mileage in our sample is 16,167 km, a surprisingly high figure for a small country, 
higher than in the USA or Western Europe.  High users drive newer cars and maintain them well; older 
cars are more often maintained in small shops – besides the obvious remark that cars can only be 
owned very long if the annual mileage is low.  Also, very low mileage cars are excluded from the sample, 
as they do not have the two repair shop visits that are needed to extrapolate mileage.  This could result 
in our sample drivers having a higher claim frequency. 
4.3. Variables 
For all policyholders in our sample, the values of the following variables are recorded. 
Gender  Gender is a classification variable used in rating.  Only 29.49% of policies are registered as 
males, a clear indication that policyholders take advantage of their knowledge of differential rates to get 
a premium discount.  So it is all but certain that policies registered in the “female driver” category 
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include a large number of cars owned by couples, often driven by males. Repair shops report that over 
80% of their customers are males. 
Age  Age is also used in rating.  While for rating purposes the company uses five age categories (< 20, 20-
25, 25-30, 30-60, >60), less than 1% of drivers are between ages 20 and 25, and only a handful are 
between 18 (the minimum driving age) and 20.  Consequently, we combined the first three age 
categories and ended up with three classes: under 30 (7.38% of drivers), 30-60 (88.76%), over 60 
(3.86%).  The large percentage of middle-age policy owners may also reflect some selection by 
policyholders.  As middle-age drivers pay a lower premium than the other groups, families have an 
incentive to register their car under the name of a 30-60 year old family member, preferably female. 
Vehicle type and use  97.9% of cars are registered as non-commercial use sedans.  Hence we discarded 
the remaining  categories (business use, trucks, passenger coaches, taxis, etc). 
Mileage Mileage is expressed in kilometers driven per day.  Repair shop technicians note date and 
odometer reading on each visit of the car to the shop.  If two or more visits are recorded, extrapolation 
or interpolation then yields the annual mileage.  As an example of mileage calculation (Huang et al, 
20xx), assume a driver has three visits to the repair shop.  His odometer readings are 13,200 on October 
1, 2001, 24,400 on April 1, 2002 (182 days later, 91 days into 2002, 274 days before January 1, 2003, and 
37,400 on January 15, 2003 (289 days later, 15 days into 2003).  The estimate of the number of 
kilometers driven in 2002 is 
(24,400-13,200) x (91/182) + (37,400-24,400) x (274/289) = 17,925 
A visual inspection of the data shows numerous instances of obvious recording mistakes, with mileages 
like -44,581 km or +24,833 km.  Truncating the upper and lower 1% of the data seems a conservative 
approach, eliminating all unrealistic figures.  The truncation daily mileage varies across policy years, 
averaging 7.43 km and 133.37 km.  The remaining 98% of policies are then subdivided in ten deciles.  
Average class limits are provided in table 2.  For instance, the third mileage class includes all cars driven 
between 25.24 and 30.44 km per day, from the 20th to the 30th percentile.  
Mileage deciles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Average class limit 19.02 25.24 30.44 35.27 40.32 46.13 54.73 62.22 76.42 
Table 2: Average limits for the ten mileage classes, in km per day. 
 After elimination of business users, trucks, and the unreasonable mileage figures, the total 
sample size is 259,065.  The average annual number of kilometers driven per car in our sample is 16,167. 
 Several variables are recorded by the company for classification purposes.  They include: 
Marital status  92.03% of policy owners are married – probably a higher percentage than in the overall 
insured population, due to selection. 
Car age  26.45% of cars in the sample are under one year of age.  26.19% are between ages 1 and 2, 
18.4% between ages 2 and 3, 12.38% between ages 3 and 4, 8.05% between ages 4 and 5, 8.53% are 
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older.  Newer cars are possibly over-represented in our sample, as owners of new cars tend to follow 
maintenance guidelines more strictly; owners of older cars may look for cheaper shops for repairs and 
maintenance, or perform basic maintenance on their own.  On the other hand, as the car manufacturer 
recommends maintenance every 10,000 km, low-mileage drivers may not visit the repair shop twice in 
their first driving year; as a minimum of two visits are required to extrapolate annual mileage, this may 
result in an under-representation of brand-new cars in our sample. 
City 49.99% of our sample drivers live in an urban area. 
Territory 47.45% of cars are registered in the north of Taiwan, 30.16% in the south, 17.31% in central 
Taiwan, and 5.08% in the eastern part of the island. 
Cubic capacity of engine The engine capacity is under 1,800 cc for 65.80% of cars, between 1,800 and 
2,000 for 28.92% of cars, and above 2,000 cc for the remaining 5.28%. 
4.4. Claim Frequencies 
Table 3 provides claim frequencies (= average number of claims per policy-year) for all classes of the 
rating variables age and gender. 
Age group Males Females All 
< 30 0.0674 0.0652 0.0661 
30 – 60 0.0473 0.0562 0.0537 
> 60 0.0477 0.0523 0.0500 
All 0.0493 0.0567 0.0545 
Table 3: Claim frequencies for rating variables 
 The overall claim frequency (0.0545) in our sample is substantially larger than the frequency of 
0.0343 observed in the entire portfolio of our insurer, for over 4.5 million policy-years.  There is thus a 
substantial selection effect in our sample, despite the fact that the drivers in our database are likely 
more responsible than average.  This seems to validate our conjecture that our sample consist of high-
mileage drivers. 
 Surprisingly, the average claim frequency is higher for females (0.0567) than males (0.0493).  
Yet, females are the ones getting a discount.  This surprising result is not specific to our sample, as it is 
also observed in the entire 4.5 million policies of the insurance company (male claim frequency: 0.0299; 
female: 0.0403).  Possible explanations for this result include: 
1. The main difference between male and female drivers lies in claim severity: males have 
significantly more costly accidents – and this justifies the male surcharge. 
2. This confirms that the “female” group mostly consists of couples, with the male doing most of 
the driving for cultural reasons.  “Female” – rated policies are for the most part driven by males.  
Couples are likelier to drive more that singles.   
3. Note that differentiated mileage across “males” and “females” is not an explanation, as the 
average daily numbers of kilometers for males (46.38) and females (43.42) are hardly different. 
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Table 4 and Figure 1 provide claim frequencies as a function of mileage. Table 4 also presents variances 
of claim distributions. 
 
Mileage deciles Average mid-point (km) Claim frequency Variance 
1   13.23  0.0351 0.0497 
2   22.13 0.0344 0.0480 
3   27.84 0.0434 0.0610 
4   32.86 0.0470 0.0645 
5   37.80 0.0511 0.0717 
6   43.23 0.0554 0.0770 
7   50.43 0.0593 0.0828 
8   58.47 0.0632 0.0884 
9   69.32 0.0721 0.1005 
10 104.90 0.0838 0.1211 
Table 4: Mean and variance of claim count distribution for ten mileage classes 
       
 
Figure 1: Claim frequency as a function of daily number of kilometers 
 As shown in all previous studies, claim frequencies increase with mileage, but in a less-than-















In this section, the following probit and ordered probit regression models analyze the importance of 
annual mileage, as compared to other classification variables.  
Probit (Cit) = α + β1Xit + β2Yit+ β3BMSit + β4Mileageit + β5Dt + εit 
where, in the probit model, Cit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if policyholder i had a claim in year 
t, and 0 if he did not.  In the ordered probit model, Cit is the number of claims for policyholder i in year t. 
Xit is an array of rating variables (gender and age) that vary with individual and time.  Yit is an array of 
possible other classification variables (marital status, car age, city, territory, engine cubic capacity). BMSit 
is the bonus-malus coefficient.  Mileageit is the actual mileage recorded for driver i in year t.  Dt is a set 
of annual dummy variables used to control year effects.  β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 are coefficients 
corresponding to these variables.  εit is the error term for individual i in year t.   
The main variable of interest is annual mileage.  Its coefficient β4 will be positive and significant 
if, as expected, mileage driven is an important risk factor for the number of claims. The coefficient of 
BMS β3 is also expected to be significantly positive, as a higher BMS class implies higher risk. The 
significance of this a posteriori variable may change once annual mileage and all other a priori 
classification variables are included in the regression model, if BMS captures residual risk differences 
undetected by the current rating factors.  
Tables 5 and 6 present summary statistics and correlation coefficients for all variables.  
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Age<30 0.0738 0.2614 
Age30-60 0.8876 0.3158 
Age60+ 0.0386 0.1927 
Female 0.7051 0.4556 
Married 0.9203 0.2708 
Car age0 0.2645 0.4411 
Car age1 0.2619 0.4397 
Car age2 0.1840 0.3875 
Car age3 0.1238 0.3294 
Car age4 0.0805 0.2720 
Capacity 2 0.2892 0.4534 
Capacity 3 0.0528 0.2237 
City 0.4999 0.5 
North 0.4745 0.4994 
South 0.3016 0.4590 
Middle 0.1731 0.3784 
BMS 0.8180 0.1332 
Mileage 44.29 22.69 
   Number of observations: 259,065 
         Table 5: Summary Statistics 
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City North South Middle BMS Mileage 
Age<30 1 
-0.793 -0.056 -0.062 -0.263 0.043 0.026 -0.004 -0.021 -0.031 -0.061 -0.040 -0.027 -0.009 -0.009 0.022 0.093 0.0553 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0301 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Age3060  1 
-0.563 0.108 0.194 -0.012 -0.006 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.050 0.022 0.022 0.005 0.013 -0.017 -0.044 -0.012 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0015 0.3502 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0095 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Age60+   1 
-0.093 0.038 -0.039 -0.026 0.002 0.013 0.026 0.0013 0.017 0.000 0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.053 -0.054 
  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1584 <.0001 <.0001 0.4879 <.0001 0.8504 0.0339 <.0001 0.2576 <.0001 <.0001 
Female    1 
0.063 0.031 0.007 -0.004 -0.010 -0.017 -0.074 -0.063 -0.039 -0.092 0.060 0.041 0.036 -0.052 
   
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0133 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Married     1 
0.009 0.0042 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.0440 0.0335 -0.016 0.005 -0.022 0.009 0.003 -0.012 
    
<.0001 0.0327 0.0825 0.0007 0.1542 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0037 <.0001 <.0001 0.0605 <.0001 
Carage0      1 
-0.357 -0.284 -0.225 -0.177 0.014 -0.027 -0.064 -0.101 0.061 0.045 0.697 0.014 
     
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Carage1       1 
-0.282 -0.223 -0.176 0.027 -0.015 0.014 0.042 -0.029 -0.016 0.0155 0.02 
      
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Carage2        1 
-0.178 -0.140 0.0110 0.001 0.021 0.033 -0.021 -0.012 -0.247 -0.006 
       
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5051 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0014 
Carage3 














-0.011 -0.275 -0.008 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Carage4          1 
-0.018 0.019 0.015 0.014 -0.006 -0.009 -0.226 -0.014 
         
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Capacity
2 
          1 
-0.15 0.05 0.041 -0.018 -0.025 -0.025 0.061 
          
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Capacity
3 
           1 
0.026 0.015 -0.024 0.009 -0.016 0.006 
           
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0021 
City             1 
0.152 -0.142 0.106 -0.062 -0.118 
            
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
North              1 
-0.624 -0.434 -0.091 -0.015 
             
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
South               1 
-0.300 0.059 0.027 
              
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Middle                1 
0.036 -0.029 
               
<.0001 <.0001 
BMS                 1 
0.027 
                
<.0001 
Mileage                  1 
                 
Table 6. Correlations 
15 
 
 Table 7 shows the result of probit models regression analyses. Results from the ordered probit 
models are almost identical to the probit models.  They are presented in Appendix I.  Model (1) includes 
all current rating variables together with BMS. All variables are significant at the 1% level. Surprisingly, 
the sign of the female variable is positive, which is counter-intuitive; the signs of all other variables are 
as expected. Female drivers get a discount, in Taiwan as most other countries, but regression results 
suggest that females report more claims than male drivers, supporting our conjecture that this variable 
is unreliable.  Note the enormous significance of BMS – it is far more important than all other variables, 
as measured by the chi-square metric.  
 
In model (2), the annual mileage variable is added, and found, as expected, to have a hugely 
significant positive effect: it has the largest chi-square of all variables, followed by BMS.  The marginal 
effects of mileage at various points are presented in Figure 2 and Table 8.  Figure 2 presents the 
increased claim probability when the mileage class is increased from i to i+1 in year 2007. The blue line 
shows the marginal effects at median values of all other variables; the red line shows the marginal 
effects for a high risk group (age <30, female, worst BMS class), and the green line for a low risk group 
(age 30-60, male, best BMS class).  Figure 2 shows that the marginal effects are all positive: the claim 
probability increases with mileage driven. Interestingly, this probability increase is larger for high 
mileage drivers: the claim probability increases by 0.25% when the mileage class changes from 1 to 2, 
and by 0.49% when the mileage class changes from 9 to 10, for a median policyholder.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















































































AIC 91047.101 90287.378 90893.924 90106.221 
Likelihood Ratio 476.1761 1237.8987 653.353 1443.056 
Number of Obs.  259,065 259,065 259,065 259,065 
Three figures are provided in each cell.  The above number is the regression coefficient. Below is the 
value of the Wald Chi-square and, between parentheses, the probability to exceed the Chi-square value. 
(p-value).  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level.  Annual dummy variables are 
included in all regressions, but not reported.  They are all insignificant in the four selected models. For 
AIC (Likelihood Ratio), smaller (larger) value means better fit.  
Table 7: Probit regressions 
 
We expect the effect of mileage on claims to be larger for high risk groups than low risk groups; 
as a policyholder drives more, the chance of accident should increase more if the driver is high risk. This 
conjecture is tested by examining marginal effects at various points.  Figure 2 shows that marginal 
effects for high risks are larger than for median and low risk groups in all mileage classes. Table 9 
provides the claim probability increases, at various BMS coefficient levels, when the mileage class is 
changed from 1 to 10 for the three risk groups. As expected, Table 9 supports the conjecture that the 
claim probability increases more as high risks drives more. When the mileage class of a young male 
driver in the highest BMS class increases from 1 to 10, the probability of claim raises by 7.12%;  for a 
male driver age 30 to 60 in the best BMS class, the change in claim probability is only 2.62%. Hence 
mileage is a more important variable for high risks; the impact of mileage is smaller for low risks. 
Therefore, if mileage is to be used as a rating variable, it is recommended to adapt a non-linear rating 
structure to reflect this difference. To check for the possibility that results may be influenced by the 
Normal link function used in Probit regressions, we also calculated marginal effects using Logit 
regression.  Results provided in table 8 show that our results are very robust.  
We conjectured that, possibly, the inclusion of mileage could reduce the explanatory power of 
BMS, if one of the residual risks captured by BMS is mileage driven. Results from models (1) and (2) 
suggest that this is not the case. The regression coefficient and chi-square values of BMS are only slightly 
reduced between model (1) and model (2), and BMS remains very significantly positive, implying that 
BMS contains important risk classification information unrelated to mileage. The inclusion of mileage 
reduces the chi-square value and the magnitude of Age 60+.  The negative correlation between Age60+ 
and Mileage presented in Table 6 supports the interpretation that the annual mileage of elderly people 





Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Mileage  
 
Risk Group by Rating Variable BMS coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
(Probit) 
Marginal Effect  
(Logit)  
High: Age<30, Female 1.6 7.12% 8.58% 
 
1.5 6.62% 7.78% 
 
1.4 6.14% 7.04% 
 
1.3 5.68% 6.35% 
Low: Age: 30 to 60, Male 1 3.57% 3.56% 
 
0.9 3.23% 3.18% 
 
0.8 2.92% 2.83% 
 
0.7 2.62% 2.52% 
Table 8: Marginal Effects of Mileage  
 
In models (3) and (4), all available classification variables are added.  Mileage remains the most 
significant variable, as measured by the chi-square value, supporting the idea that annual mileage can 
be a very effective rating factor. Similar to the comparison of models (1) and (2), the inclusion of mileage 
variable does not affect the coefficient and the significance of BMS much. However, while BMS remains 
significant at the 1% level, its chi-square value is much reduced, from 286 to 9.4, by the inclusion of 
other classification variables, mostly car age, engine capacity, and territory.  It seems that BMS acts as a 
substitute for risk information that could be captured by other observable variables.  
The significant classification variables that could potentially be included in rating include car age, 
engine cubic capacity, and territory.  The number of claims decreases with car age, whether or not 
mileage is included in the regression model.  Car less than two years old have a highly significantly larger 














territorial variables, only North has a significant effect, possibly due to the better quality of roads around 
the capital city of Taipei.  While in most similar studies authors found that city drivers have more claims, 
this does not appear to be the case in Taiwan.  This could be due to the fact that, in Taipei and other 
large cities, scooters have designated separate lanes, much reducing the probability of an impact with 
cars. These improved road designs have yet to be implemented in rural areas.   
 The conclusions of regression analyses are very strong.  While we expected annual mileage to 
have a significant positive impact on claim frequencies, the very large chi-square values obtained for 
mileage, with and without other classification variables, indicate that, by far, mileage is the most 
accurate variable that insurers could introduce.  The impact of mileage on claim frequencies surpasses 
the influence of all other variables, including BMS, by a wide margin.  The significance of BMS, however, 
is not decreased by the inclusion of mileage.  The Taiwanese BMS is fairly mild: penalties are not severe, 
when compared to BMs in force in most countries.  Should Taiwanese companies decide to make 
transition rules and premium levels more severe, the significance of BMS would most probably increase.  
Introducing new variables such as car age, territory, and cubic capacity instead of a more severe BMS, 
while actuarially justified, would result in a complicated rating system with a large number of variables, 
that would be more difficult to understand by brokers and consumers.  So bonus-malus systems should 
remain an important component of auto insurance rating.   
 
6. Impact on Taiwanese Bonus-Malus System 
The study of bonus-malus systems (BMS) became an important area of research in non-life actuarial 
science in the 1960s, jump-started by the first ASTIN Colloquium, held in La Baule in 1959 and devoted 
exclusively to the topic.  Numerous authors designed tools to evaluate and compare existing BMS, and 
to design improved systems.  This research is summarized in Lemaire (1995), among others. Noteworthy 
is the fact that BMS research developed independently of the study of other rating variables.  Yet, 
authors appeared to be aware that the two subjects (a priori and a posteriori rating) should be 
connected.  For instance, Lemaire and Zi (1994) observed that “The government may then seek to 
correct for the inadequacies of the a priori system by using a “tough” BMS” and “… the use of more a 
priori classification variables is expected in free market countries, which decreases the need for a 
sophisticated BMS” – but did not model this link in their research.  Lemaire (1995) cites adverse 
selection and insurers’ lack of knowledge of driving behavior of policyholders as one of the main reasons 
to introduce BMS, even mentioning annual mileage as main example. 
 Taylor (1997) was the first author to model explicitly the relation between BMS and other rating 
factors.  He noted that failing to consider jointly a priori classification variables and BMS could lead to 
double-counting similar effects.  For instance, young drivers are likely to be penalized by a high a priori 
surcharge, while gravitating to the malus zone of the BMS due to claims, thereby cumulating an explicit 
a priori penalty with an implicit BMS surcharge.  For a given BMS with known number of classes and 
transition rules, Taylor developed a sophisticated Bayesian model, requiring extensive simulation, to 
calculate two sets of BMS premium levels: one that ignores correlations with a priori variables, and one 
that incorporates them.  Through an example, Taylor showed that the range of BMS premium levels is 
reduced when covariates are taken into account.  Unfortunately, Taylor could not access real-life data, 
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and had to use an artificially-created example, using guesswork to select cell claim frequencies and 
variances, and a nine-class BMS that no insurance company uses in practice.  Taylor assumed that, due 
to unspecified classification variables, policyholders can be subdivided in 10 risk groups, with mean 
group claim frequencies ranging from 6.5% to 50.5%, and fairly low within-group variation.  With the 
premium level set at 100 for the starting class of the baseline BMS, simulated claim frequencies, 
uncorrected for rating variables, justify premium levels ranging from 55 to 150.  Recognizing the impact 
of classification variables, premiums levels range from 73 to 123.  In other words, accounting for the 
impact of covariates, the range of BMS premium levels can be reduced significantly: a much less severe 
BMS is needed to reflect varying driving behaviors.   
 The Taiwanese BMS and data provide us with a unique opportunity to implement Taylor’s path-
breaking work with real-life data, and to check whether the inclusion of annual mileage as an a priori 
rating variable would require a modification of the existing BMS.  
 Essential characteristics of the model are as follows (for theoretical developments, see Taylor, 
1997).  All policyholders are subdivided in ten mileage classes, as described in section 4.3.  A classical 
negative binomial distribution is used in each class; the number of claims of each policyholder is 
assumed to be Poisson-distributed, with a parameter that varies according to a Gamma distribution.  
While Taylor used the moments method to estimate the parameters of each negative binomial 
distribution, two other estimation techniques are used here: 
(i) The maximum likelihood method 
(ii) Following a suggestion by Johnson et al (2005), a “Mean and P(0)” method that determines 
parameters by matching the observed and theoretical mean and the probability of no claim.  
This method appears efficient when a large proportion of insureds incurs no claim in a given 
year; it provides a slightly better fit than the maximum likelihood method, as measured by 
the χ2 distance. 
 For the low claim frequencies observed in Taiwan, the BMS, described in section 4.1., appears to 
approach its stationary distribution after 50 to 60 years.  Consequently, the portfolio is simulated for 60 
years, and all percentages and ratios described below pertain to year 60.  The simulation proceeds as 
follows: 
(i) By design, each mileage class contains the same number of policies.  Each driver is assigned 
to a mileage class with probability 1/10. 
(ii) Each policy is assigned a Poisson parameter, by sampling from the Gamma distribution of 
the mileage class.  The Poisson parameter does not change over time. 
(iii) The driver’s claims history is simulated for 60 years, tracking the evolution of the BMS level. 
 For maximum likelihood estimators, simulation results are summarized in tables 8 to 10. Similar 
tables for the “Mean and P(0)” method are presented in Appendix II.  Table 8 presents the steady-state 
distribution of policyholders across mileage and BMS classes.  Due to the low claim frequencies 
observed in Taiwan and the mild transition rules of the BMS (a three-class penalty per claim), a huge 
clustering of policies in class 1 takes place, with over 88% of policyholders eventually reaching this high-
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discount class.  As expected, a selection effect according to mileage takes place, with more low-mileage 
users ending up in BMS class 1, and high-mileage users more likely to occupy BMS class 10, creating a 
potential “double-counting” effect if annual mileage is introduced as a rating variable without taking 
into consideration its effect on BMS premiums.   









 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 .9320 .0091 .0099 .0124 .0048 .0058 .0059 .0063 .0099 .0148 
2 .9186 .0085 .0109 .0123 .0042 .0053 .0057 .0052 .0082 .0128 
3 .9082 .0083 .0118 .0142 .0070 .0083 .0080 .0071 .01228 .0193 
4 .8862 .0115 .0154 .0186 .0057 .0069 .0093 .0092 .0131 .0188 
5 .8927 .0135 .0158 .0168 .0075 .0090 .0065 .0107 .0128 .0223 
6 .8702 .0122 .0157 .0157 .0100 .0098 .0098 .0088 .0152 .0263 
7 .8782 .0126 .0158 .0174 .0082 .0088 .0117 .0104 .0135 .0241 
8 .8569 .0141 .0169 .0215 .0083 .0113 .0114 .0134 .0174 .0279 
9 .8510 .0157 .0181 .0253 .0077 .0113 .0112 .0121 .0201 .0320 
10 .8245 .0191 .0214 .0229 .0112 .0130 .0122 .0138 .0201 .0349 
All .8819 .0125 .0152 .0177 .0075 .0090 .0092 .0097 .0142 .0233 
Table 9: Stationary distribution of policyholders across mileage and bonus-malus classes, maximum 
likelihood estimators 
 Table 10 presents, for each BMS class,  
(i) the steady-state population of each class 
(ii) the “true claim frequency”, or “raw claim frequency”, which is the claim frequency 
effectively observed in each BMS, without taking into account annual mileage 
(iii) the “cell claim frequency”, or “expected claim frequency”, which is the claim frequency 
expected in each BMS class using for each policyholder the claim frequency predicted by his 
mileage class – the average of his mileage class 
(iv) the ratio “true/cell claim frequency” which measures the difference between actual and 
expected driving behavior based on mileage.  The difference is due to the fact that, for 
instance, poor drivers have more accidents than the average of their mileage class.  In 
essence, the impact of mileage is removed. 
BMS level % drivers True claim frequency Cell claim frequency Ratio: true/cell 
1 88.19%   1.43% 5.40%     26.40% 
2   1.25% 12.36% 5.82%   212.36% 
3   1.52% 11.47% 5.76%   199.13% 
4   1.77% 16.54% 5.77%   286.73% 
5   0.75% 20.78% 5.80%   358.23% 
6   0.90% 27.60% 5.83%   473.38% 
7   0.92% 35.01% 5.79%   604.58% 
8   0.97% 41.13% 5.84%   704.35% 
9   1.42% 51.58% 5.83%   884.79% 
10   2.33% 72.77% 5.88% 1237.59% 
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Table 10: Steady-state distribution of policyholders, claim frequencies, maximum likelihood estimators. 
 Table 11 presents main results: the BMS levels as they are now, the BMS levels suggested by the 
simulation when the effect of covariates is ignored, and the BMS levels recognizing covariates.  BMS 
levels ignoring covariates are obtained by standardizing true claim frequencies, setting the rate for 
starting class 4 at 100%.  Suggested BMS levels are extremely low in class 1, and high in all malus classes.  
With overall claim frequencies in Taiwan very low, a large proportion of drivers practically never has an 
accident; these drivers rapidly end up in the best class, and, with few exceptions, stay there.  Hence the 
observed claim frequency in class 1 is extremely low.  On the other hand, given the large clustering of 
policies in the low BMS classes, classes 5 to 10 will be sparsely populated by poor drivers.  Reaching class 
10 requires multiple accidents, and a driving history that is rare in Taiwan.  Consequently class 10 (and, 
to a lesser extent, classes 5 to 9) is occupied by the poorest drivers, who exhibit very high accident rates.   
BMS level Current BMS levels BMS levels ignoring 
covariates 
BMS levels recognizing 
covariates 
1   70     8.62%     9.21% 
2   80   74.71%   74.06% 
3   90   69.33%   69.45% 
4 100 100.00% 100.00% 
5 110 125.59% 124.94% 
6 120 166.81% 165.09% 
7 130 211.59% 210.85% 
8 140 248.63% 245.65% 
9 150 311.79% 308.58% 
10 160 439.85% 431.62% 
Table 11: Current BMS levels, simulated BMS levels ignoring and recognizing covariates 
 Of course the design of a BMS needs to take into account many factors besides actuarial claim 
ratios, as BMS need to be accepted by management, regulators, customers.  Regulators do not want a 
BMS so severe than it would promote hit-and-run behavior.  Management also is not in favor of harsh 
penalties, as high malus premium level would encourage policyholders to leave the company, and try to 
get a fresh BMS start with another insurer, finding a strategy to “game” the system and by-pass 
information exchange across companies.  So, a BMS with levels as high as suggested by the third column 
of table 10, while actuarially justified, would never be accepted by other stakeholders.  Still, observed 
claim frequencies suggest that Taiwanese insurance companies have some room to make their BMS 
more severe.   
 BMS levels recognizing covariates are obtained by standardizing the “true/cell ratios” from table 
9.  They avoid double-counting by removing the mileage effect.  Due to the low variability of claim 
frequencies across mileage classes, and the large concentration of policyholders in BMS class 1 
independently of mileage, taking into account mileage differentials hardly modifies suggested BMS 
levels.  This conclusion is very different from the results obtained by Taylor (1997), due to major 
differences in examples.  Taylor considers ten rating classes, with claim frequencies ranging from 6.5% 
to 50.5%, and low variability within each class (coefficients of variation from 0.40 to 0.75).  In Taiwan, 
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the ten mileage-based rating classes have a much narrower range of claim frequencies, from 3.51% to 
8.38%.  Moreover, within-class variability is much higher, with coefficients of variations all in excess of 
2.5.  Consequently, while Taylor’s ten distributions of Poisson parameters are well separated, ours 
overlap to a large extent, and recognizing covariates in BMS levels has a very limited impact.  An attempt 
to subdivide the data in five mileage classes instead of ten to achieve more separation of distributions 
did not provide conclusive results. 
 The results from this section confirm conclusions from regression analyses.  The interaction 
between mileage and BMS is small, so that the introduction of mileage in rating would not justify a 
significant weakening of the BMS premium levels.  The “double-counting” effect is minimal.  Mileage 
cannot “replace” BMS rating, cannot be used to reduce BMS discounts and penalties.  Consequently, 
BMS should continue to play a major role in auto insurance rating in Taiwan. 
7. Conclusions 
In this research we have used the unique database of a major insurance carrier in Taiwan to investigate 
whether annual mileage should be introduced as a rating variable in auto third-party liability insurance.   
Admittedly, several characteristics of Taiwan and its insurance market are quite different from other 
countries: extreme traffic density, low number of cars given the high average wealth level, compulsory 
insurance that only requires bodily injury coverage with fairly low policy limits.  However, our results are 
so strong that we can confidently extend them to all affluent countries.  Annual mileage is an extremely 
powerful predictor of the number of claims at-fault.  Its significance, as measured by Wald’s chi-square 
and its associated p-value, by far exceed that of all other variables, including bonus-malus.  This 
conclusion applies independently of all other variables possibly included in rating. 
 Insurance companies are at a crossroads.  Several variables commonly used are being 
questioned by regulators.  The E.U. now forbids the use of gender rating.  Territory is being challenged 
as a substitute for race.  Insurers are being pressured to find new variables, that predict accidents more 
accurately and are socially acceptable.  Annual mileage seems an ideal candidate variable, to be 
introduced in rating whenever feasible.  The recent development of GPS systems, on-board computers, 
and telematics devices, and the rapid decrease in price of the new technologies, should induce carriers 
to explore ways to minimize problems associated with Pay-As-You-Drive insurance. 
 The inclusion of annual mileage as a new rating variable should, however, not take place at the 
expense of bonus-malus systems.  Bonus-malus systems are not a substitute for annual mileage, on the 
contrary the information contained in the bonus-malus premium level complements the value of annual 
mileage.  An accurate rating system should therefore include annual mileage and bonus-malus as the 
two main building blocks, possibly supplemented by the use of other variables like age and territory. 
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Appendix I: Regression results, Ordered Probit. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 




































































City   -0.0073 0.0214** 
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0.64 (0.4222) 5.37 (0.0204) 












AIC 105105.62 104340.02 104932 104139.39 
Likelihood Ratio 473.9446 1241.544 671.56 1466.1688 
Number of Obs.  259065 259065 259065 259065 
Three figures are provided in each cell.  The above number is the regression coefficient. Below is the 
value of the Wald Chi-square and, between parentheses, the probability to exceed the Chi-square value 
(p-value).  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level.  Annual dummy variables are 
included in all regressions, but not reported.  They are all insignificant in the four selected models. For 
AIC (Likelihood Ratio), smaller (larger) value means better fit. 
 
Table A1 : Ordered Probit regressions 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 .9233 .0085 .0094 .0115 .0051 .0052 .0064 .0063 .0084 .0148 
2 .9217 .0092 .0107 .0124 .0050 .0058 .0059 .0061 .0090 .0142 
3 .9053 .0103 .0115 .0136 .0062 .0069 .0071 .0079 .0106 .0183 
4 .8954 .0126 .0140 .0168 .0069 .0075 .0087 .0084 .0119 .0192 
5 .8920 .0119 .0144 .0155 .0072 .0081 .0087 .0089 .0133 .0209 
6 .8783 .0132 .0148 .0177 .0087 .0089 .0094 .0103 .0136 .0236 
7 .8706 .0135 .0152 .0181 .0091 .0090 .0102 .0118 .0150 .0248 
8 .8668 .0154 .0167 .0187 .0087 .0097 .0109 .0122 .0164 .0274 
9 .8486 .0168 .0185 .0221 .0102 .0105 .0125 .0136 .0191 .0321 
10 .8278 .0169 .0195 .0232 .0113 .0119 .0135 .0146 .0224 .0373 
All .8830 .0128 .0145 .0170 .0078 .0083 .0093 .0100 .0140 .0233 
Table A2-1: Stationary distribution of policyholders across mileage and bonus-malus classes, “Mean and 
P(0)” estimators 
 





1 88.30%   1.36% 5.40%     25.19% 
2   1.28% 12.46% 5.76%   216.32% 
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3   1.45% 13.53% 5.76%   234.90% 
4   1.70% 15.15% 5.76%   263.02% 
5   0.78% 24.10% 5.83%   413.38% 
6   0.83% 28.11% 5.80%   484.66% 
7   0.93% 33.01% 5.83%   566.21% 
8   1.00% 42.97% 5.86%   733.28% 
9   1.40% 54.20% 5.90%   918.64% 
10   2.33% 73.30% 5.90% 1242.37% 
Table A2-2: Steady-state distribution of policyholders, claim frequencies, “Mean and P(0)” estimators. 
 
BMS level Current BMS levels BMS levels ignoring 
covariates 
BMS levels recognizing 
covariates 
1   70     8.86%     9.50% 
2   80   86.42%   88.56% 
3   90   82.70%   83.28% 
4 100 100.00% 100.00% 
5 110 148.68% 146.90% 
6 120 172.82% 173.42% 
7 130 203.46% 202.06% 
8 140 269.70% 264.67% 
9 150 326.50% 324.81% 
10 160 472.44% 462.85% 
Table A2-3: Current BMS levels, simulated BMS levels ignoring and recognizing covariates, “Mean and 
P(0) estimators 
 
 
 
